Piracy in the Go industry.

[hyperpape]

Kirby, there are two ways of looking at it that make sense to me: the newspapers, Nihon Ki-in, book publishers, etc. are copyright holders of the game records. But John and TMark are generally fastidious about contacting those entities and ensuring that they do not feel affront at their actions.

Alternately, you might think that the records are essentially public domain. In that case, there's no question that you can reproduce it and sell it. After all, there's a whole industry of people making money publishing inexpensive versions of Shakespeare. But also, if you take a public domain work and create a derivative, you have copyright over the derivative work. That is akin to John and TMark providing commentary and suchlike.

[Kirby]

Kirby, there are two ways of looking at it that make sense to me: the newspapers, Nihon Ki-in, book publishers, etc. are copyright holders of the game records. But John and TMark are generally fastidious about contacting those entities and ensuring that they do not feel affront at their actions.

Alternately, you might think that the records are essentially public domain. In that case, there's no question that you can reproduce it and sell it. After all, there's a whole industry of people making money publishing inexpensive versions of Shakespeare. But also, if you take a public domain work and create a derivative, you have copyright over the derivative work. That is akin to John and TMark providing commentary and suchlike.

Or the third way, which Sedol argued: the ownership should belong to those that actually, uh... Produced the work.

[nagano]

The article is interesting, but it goes wrong in its focus on rivalry. This is trying to decide whether or not IP is legitimate from a utilitarian perspective (though it fails to address the issue even in that regard), rather than focusing on the all-important question of whether or not it is a natural property right.

You're the one who brought up rivalrousness in the first place ("scarcity" in your terms). The article was a focused rebuttal of the claim that scarcity is the essential feature of property, which is your claim. As far as I can see, utilitarianism doesn't enter into the issue at all.

Edit: Nagano, you should note my earlier post that points out that most of the requires of current IP law could be created via private contracts, and of course publishers are currently able to opt out of copyright law via the GPL or public domain. So I think a "high church" libertarian can't really object.

P.P.S. Am I right in thinking that I'm being directed to a for sale version of the argument against intellectual property? I hope there's a freely available copy out there somewhere...

From the article:

"Property rights serve a lot of functions in our society, and property rights can attach to things that are quite nebulous indeed, like accounting entries in computers that exist in a physical space not visible to the naked eye."

If information is not already public, and it is discovered by hacking into someone else's computer or some other form of espionage, their property has been violated. They have an absolute right of ownership in their own copies of software and hardware, and thus against its being intruded upon. It is not criminal because they saw or copied information, but because they were trespassing. But when you publish something, no longer do people have to aggress against their property in order to access it, learn from it, copy it whatever. So the IP holders essentially want to have their cake and eat it too; make it public, and benefit from the publicity, but prevent others from using their ideas.

"Think about a bookstore, for example. Why isn't it okay to take their books?

Because, unlike with file-sharing, I haven't deprived them of the use of the book, you will say.

But in the sense that file-sharers are talking about, Barnes and Noble is not using the book. They want to make money off of it, but they are not interested in reading it, or using it to prop up a shaky table leg, or impressing people who see it left on the coffee table. In fact, holding onto that copy of the book is costing them money.

Stealing the book doesn't deprive them of the use of the item, in the primitive way that most of the analogies offered by file sharers seem to me to depend on. What it does is deprives them of one very particular use: the ability to sell the book for its set price.

But isn't this exactly the use of which you deprive musicians of when you download an album that you otherwise would have bought? Once you download it for free, they can't sell it to you."

The whole argument over what Barnes and Noble's intent with the book is is irrelevant. It is their physical property, and they will be deprived of it if it is stolen, therefore such an action would be wrong. It is not wrong because it prevents any particular use, but because it costs money to produce and you are depriving them of something they already have. But it is hard to argue from the position that creators are entitled to funds they may or may not receive in the future.

There is a free copy linked from that very page, in EPUB and PDF formats. Here it is again:

http://mises.org/document/3582/Against- ... l-Property

And private contracts (which I do support) cannot have the same effect as IP, because only the individual who agrees to the contract can be bound to it, even if the contract says he cannot share the good in question with anyone else.

I should add that I did not just read Kinsella and become convinced; I was already convinced most IP was illegitimate from studying problems related to technology patents, and had worked out most of it myself before I had ever heard of him.

[hyperpape]

If information is not already public, and it is discovered by hacking into someone else's computer or some other form of espionage, their property has been violated. They have an absolute right of ownership in their own copies of software and hardware, and thus against its being intruded upon. It is not criminal because they saw or copied information, but because they were trespassing. But when you publish something, no longer do people have to aggress against their property in order to access it, learn from it, copy it whatever. So the IP holders essentially want to have their cake and eat it too; make it public, and benefit from the publicity, but prevent others from using their ideas.

You connect your computer to the network, set it up to accept information over that network and respond in certain ways. Someone then submits information that has unanticipated effects and you call that a crime? Sure doesn't sound like a violation of anyone's individual rights. You're sounding dangerously utilitarian!

And private contracts (which I do support) cannot have the same effect as IP, because only the individual who agrees to the contract can be bound to it, even if the contract says he cannot share the good in question with anyone else.

This is hardly obvious. Say I sell you a truck, but write a provision in the contract that it cannot be removed from my property (perhaps my property is large and you farm it). You sell the truck to B, but do not tell him about the provision. I would think that B would be compelled to obey the provision, assuming it was discovered in time. Similarly, if I receive stolen property, even unwittingly, I do not get to keep it.

Further, suppose the IP is distributed with a license. Then so long as all people are aware of that license, the contract does bind them. They may not knowingly receive that material without accepting the terms. (Again, this is exactly how the GPL works). Even if there are edge cases where a third party receives the information in ignorance of the terms, in the ordinary case, you do get the protections of ordinary copyright, without any violations of anyone's individual rights. Similarly, although I'm not sure [paging Judicata], if property is stolen, and that fact is only discovered three generations later, a third party who bought it without knowing its provenance does get to keep it.

There is a free copy linked from that very page, in EPUB and PDF formats.

I should pay better attention. I saw only the $6.00.

[judicata]

Similarly, although I'm not sure [paging Judicata], if property is stolen, and that fact is only discovered three generations later, a third party who bought it without knowing its provenance does get to keep it.

Actually, it depends. The general rule is that someone who buys stolen goods is not entitled to keep them (nemo dat rule). Depending on the circumstances, that person can sometimes sue the seller (who may or may not be the thief) for, e.g., breach of contract (more specifically, breach of the implied warranty of title).

Some property is different. At least in the U.S., a purchaser of real property (e.g., land) can take title if certain actions are taken (e.g., recording the deed).

That'll be $105.38

[Bill Spight]

Similarly, although I'm not sure [paging Judicata], if property is stolen, and that fact is only discovered three generations later, a third party who bought it without knowing its provenance does get to keep it.

Actually, it depends. The general rule is that someone who buys stolen goods is not entitled to keep them (nemo dat rule). Depending on the circumstances, that person can sometimes sue the seller (who may or may not be the thief) for, e.g., breach of contract (more specifically, breach of the implied warranty of title).

Some property is different. At least in the U.S., a purchaser of real property (e.g., land) can take title if certain actions are taken (e.g., recording the deed).

That'll be $105.38

A man riding a commuter train takes out his phone and works on some go problems. The fellow sitting next to him, an Asian gentleman, shows some interest. It turns out that the Asian is a go professional on holiday. They exchange business cards. The man then asks a question about a joseki that he recently misplayed. The pro points out the correct play, shortly before getting off the train. The next day the man receives a bill from the pro for $100. He is initially indignant, but upon reflection is unsure whether he should pay the pro.

The next morning on the same train his seat mate is a lawyer, and he asks the lawyer if he should pay the go pro the $100. The lawyer points out that he knew the guy was a pro when he asked his advice, and therefore he should pay him for his professional advice. The man thanks the lawyer. The next day he gets a bill from the lawyer for $100.

[nagano]

You connect your computer to the network, set it up to accept information over that network and respond in certain ways. Someone then submits information that has unanticipated effects and you call that a crime? Sure doesn't sound like a violation of anyone's individual rights. You're sounding dangerously utilitarian!

Funny, but I think you know that intent plays an important role in crime, and if we have previously determined that the machine and software are the property of the user, then it is a clear violation of those property rights, no?

This is hardly obvious. Say I sell you a truck, but write a provision in the contract that it cannot be removed from my property (perhaps my property is large and you farm it). You sell the truck to B, but do not tell him about the provision. I would think that B would be compelled to obey the provision, assuming it was discovered in time. Similarly, if I receive stolen property, even unwittingly, I do not get to keep it.

If B never signed the provision, he cannot be bound to it. That is the difference between private contracts and IP; a private contract is only valid between the original seller and buyer, but third parties cannot be held to it, whereas with IP, everyone is compelled to abide by the contract whether or not they were bound directly by the contract.

Further, suppose the IP is distributed with a license. Then so long as all people are aware of that license, the contract does bind them. They may not knowingly receive that material without accepting the terms. (Again, this is exactly how the GPL works). Even if there are edge cases where a third party receives the information in ignorance of the terms, in the ordinary case, you do get the protections of ordinary copyright, without any violations of anyone's individual rights.

True, but with no IP, even a license like the GPL would be non-binding to third parties (i.e. non-buyers). The GPL simply works within the current system to waive IP rights, quite successfully I might add.

Here is an excerpt from Kinsella that illustrates the point:

Contract vs. Reserved Rights

Third parties, then, who are not parties to the contract and are not in privity with the contractual obligor and obligee, are not bound by the contractual relationship. For this reason, although an innovator can use contract to stop specified individuals from freely using his ideas, it is difficult to use standard contract law to prevent third parties from using ideas they glean from others. Perhaps sensing this problem, some quasi-IP advocates shift from a purely contractual approach to a “reservation of rights” approach in which property rights in tangible resources are seen as a divisible bundle of rights.
For example, under the standard bundle-of-rights view, a landowner can sell the mineral estate to an oil company while retaining all rights to the surface, except for an easement (servitude) granting passage to a neighbor and a life estate (usufruct) granting use of the surface estate to his mother. Drawing on the bundle-of-rights notion, the “reservation of rights” approach holds that a type of “private” IP can be privately generated by creatively “reserving rights” to reproduce tangible items sold to purchasers.
Rothbard, for example, argues that one can grant conditional “ownership” (of “knowledge”) to another, while “retaining the ownership power to disseminate the knowledge of the invention.” Or, Brown, the inventor of an improved mousetrap, can stamp it “copyright” and thereby sell the right to each mousetrap except for the right to reproduce it. Like the real rights accompanying statutory IP, such “reservations” allegedly bind everyone, not just those who have contracted with the original seller. Thus, third parties who become aware of, purchase, or otherwise come into possession of the restricted item also cannot reproduce it—not because they have entered into a contract with Brown, but because “no one can acquire a greater property title in something than has already been given away or sold.” In other words, the third party acquires a tangible thing—a book or a mousetrap, say—but it is somehow “missing” the “right-to-copy” part of the bundle of rights that “normally” constitutes all rights to the thing. Or, the third party acquires “ownership” of information, from a person who did not own the information and, thus, was not entitled to transmit it to others.85
But surely something is amiss here. Suppose that A writes a novel and sells a first copy, BOOK1, without restriction (i.e., without a reservation of rights) to B1; and a second copy, BOOK2, to B2 —but “reserving” the book’s inherent “right to copy.” The two books, BOOK1 and BOOK2, appear to third parties to be otherwise identical. Yet they are not: one is incomplete; the other somehow contains more mystical “rights-essence” within its covers. Suppose B1 and B2 leave these books on a park bench, where they are discovered by third party T. According to Rothbard, BOOK2 is “missing” the “right to copy,” much like an electronic toy that is sold “batteries not included.” It is as if there is an invisible, mystical tendril of “reproduction-ownership” stretching from BOOK2 back to its true owner A, wherever he may be. Thus, even if T finds and homesteads the abandoned BOOK2, this book simply does not contain “within itself” the right to permit the owner to copy it. It is being continually siphoned away by a rights wormhole which connects the item to owner A. Thus, if T homesteads the book, he still homesteads no more than he acquires. T homesteads only a book without a right to copy “built in,” and, thus, does not have the right to copy BOOK2. The same is true for subsequent third parties who come to possess the book.
Is such a view really tenable? Can we conceive of property rights working this way? Even if we can, would it really achieve the desired result here—preventing third parties from using the protected ideas? It is difficult to maintain that rights can be reserved in this manner. One function of property rights, after all, is to prevent conflict and to put third parties on notice as to the property’s boundaries. The borders of property must necessarily be objective and intersubjectively ascertainable; they must be visible. Only if borders are visible can they be respected and property rights serve their function of permitting conflict-avoidance. Only if these borders are both visible and objectively just (justifiable in discourse) can they be expected to be adopted and followed. But think of the two books, BOOK1 and BOOK2. How could one tell the difference between them? How could one see the rights-tendril connected to the latter but not to the former? How can third parties be expected to respect an amorphous, invisible, mystical, spooky, possibly unknown and unknowable property border?
The implications of such a view are troubling. Palmer writes:
The separation and retention of the right to copy from the bundle of rights that we call property is problematic. Could one reserve the right, for example, to remember something? Suppose that I wrote a book and offered it to you to read, but I had retained one right: the right to remember it. Would I be justified in taking you to court if I could prove that you had remembered the name of the lead character in the book?86
But third parties still pose a problem for this theory. Even if a seller of an object could somehow “reserve” certain use-rights with respect to the sold object, how does this prevent third parties from using information apparent from or conveyed in that object? Reserved rights proponents say more than that the immediate buyer B1 is bound not to reproduce the book; for this result could be obtained by pointing to the implicit contract between seller A and buyer B1. Let us consider a third party, T1, who finds and reads the abandoned book, thus learning the information in it. Alternatively, consider third party T2, who never has possession of or even sees the book; he merely learns of the information in the book from gossip, graffiti, unsolicited e-mail, and so forth. Neither T1 nor T2 has a contract with A, but both now possess certain knowledge. Even if the book somehow does not contain within it a “right to reproduce,” how can this prevent T1 and T2 from using their own knowledge? And even if we say that T1 is somehow “bound” by a contractual copyright notice printed on the book (an untenable view of contract), how is T2 bound by any contract or reserved right?
Rothbard attempts to address this point as follows:
A common objection runs as follows: all right, it would be criminal for Green [the buyer] to produce and sell the Brown mousetrap; but suppose that someone else, Black, who had not made a contract with Brown, happens to see Green’s mousetrap and then goes ahead and produces and sells the replica? Why should he be prosecuted? The answer is that ... no one can acquire a greater property title in something than has already been given away or sold. Green did not own the total property right in his mousetrap, in accordance with his contract with Brown—but only all rights except to sell ... a replica. But therefore Black’s title in the mousetrap, the ownership of the ideas in Black’s head, can be no greater than Green’s, and therefore he too would be a violator of Brown’s property even though he himself had not made the actual contract.87
There are several problems with this reasoning. First of all, Black merely sees Green’s mousetrap. He does not see or have access to ideas in Green’s head. Nor does he need to have such access in order to duplicate evident features of the mousetrap.
Further, ideas in one’s head are not “owned” any more than labor is owned. Only scarce resources are owned. By losing sight of scarcity as a necessary aspect of a homesteadable thing, and of the first occupancy homesteading rule as the way to own such things, Rothbard and others are sidetracked into the mistaken notion that ideas and labor can be owned. If we recognize that ideas cannot be owned (they are not scarce resources), that creation is neither necessary nor sufficient for ownership (first occupancy is), and that labor need not be “owned” in order to be a homesteader, then the trouble caused by these confused notions disappears.
If Black somehow comes into possession of the ideas implicit in an item which Brown invented (in Rothbard’s example, he “happens to see” it), it is irrelevant that the mousetrap may not have had a “right to copy” built into it. For Black does not need such permission to use his own property as he sees fit. How does “happening to see” the mousetrap make Black a trespasser or violator of Brown’s rights?
All action, including action which employs owned scarce means (property), involves the use of technical knowledge.88 Some of this knowledge may be gained from things we see, including the property of others. We do not have to have a “right to copy” as part of a bundle of rights to have a right to impose a known pattern or form on an object we own. Rather, we have a right to do anything at all with and on our own property, provided only that we do not invade others’ property borders. We must not lose sight of this crucial libertarian point. If I own a 100-acres of land, I can prance around naked on it, not because the land is imbued with some “right-to-prance-naked,” but because I own the land and it does not (necessarily) violate the property rights of others for me to use my property in this fashion.
Similarly, I am entitled to do what I want with my own property—my car, my paper, my word processor—including improving my car’s carburetor or using my ink to print words on my paper. That is, unless I have contractually obligated myself to someone else to restrict my actions with respect to my use of this knowledge. I do not have to first find in my property a right-to-use-in-a-certain-way, for all ways of using it, except those that cause invasions of others’ property borders, are already encompassed within the general right to use my property. In libertarianism, we live by right, not permission. We do not need to find permission to take actions with our own property. Contrary to practice in totalitarian societies, all things that are not forbidden are permitted. The reservation-of-rights view would reverse this by assuming that every use of property is valid only if that particular use-right can be somehow found or located in the property.
Consider the following analogy. Farmer Jed discovers oil under his land. No one for miles around knows about the black gold. Jed plans to buy his neighbors’ property for a song; they’ll sell it cheap, too, since they don’t know about the oil. In the middle of the night, his nosy neighbor Cooter, suspicious over Jed’s recent good spirits, sneaks onto Jed’s land and discovers the truth. The next morning, at Floyd’s barbershop, Cooter spills his guts to Clem and the boys. One of them promptly runs to a pay phone and gives a tip to a reporter at the Wall Street Journal (who happens to be his nephew). Soon, it is common knowledge that there is oil in the vicinity. The neighbors now demand exorbitant prices for their land, thus spoiling Jed’s plans.
Let us grant that Cooter can be prosecuted for trespass and harms flowing therefrom. The question is, can Jed’s neighbors be prevented from acting on their knowledge? That is, may they be forced to somehow pretend that they do not know about the oil, and sell their land to Jed for what they “would have” sold it when in ignorance? Of course they may not be so forced. They own their land, and are entitled to use it as they see fit. Unlike tangible property, information is not ownable; it is not property. The possessor of a stolen watch may have to return it, but so long as the acquirer of knowledge does not obtain that knowledge illicitly or in violation of a contract, he is free to act upon it.
Note, however, that according to the reservation-of-rights view, the neighbors would not be permitted to act upon their knowledge because they obtained it ultimately from Cooter, a trespasser who had no “title” to that knowledge. Thus, they could not have obtained “greater title” to it than Cooter himself had. Note also that others, such as geological surveyors mapping oil deposits, cannot include this information in their maps. They must feign ignorance until given permission by Jed. This imposed ignorance correlates with the unnatural scarcity imposed by IP. There is clearly no warrant for the view that reserved rights can somehow prohibit third parties from using knowledge they acquire.
It is simply not legitimate to restrict the use to which an owner of property can put it unless that owner has contractually obligated himself or has otherwise acquired the information by a violation of the information-holder’s rights. Talk of reserving the right to copy is merely a way to avoid the contractual notion that only parties to a contract are bound by it.89

[FlyingAxe]

I thought this was an excellent description of the problem with IP (taken from a Mises.org forum thread):

If I said, "I hereby own all red objects" or "I bought all blue-stenciled China plates in the entire world from the King of England" no one would take these as serious property claims. A pattern or description of a class of objects is not a valid ownership claim. Let's say I was more specific, "I hereby own all objects imprinted with Shakespeare's Sonnet 116" - still no one would accept this as valid. But people get confused if it turns out that I'm Shakespeare... "I am Shakespeare and I hereby assert that I own all objects imprinted with my Sonnet 116." Of course, IP is slightly less grandiose: "I hereby claim royalty rights and copy rights of all objects imprinted with my Sonnet 116." As you can see, we've whittled down the extent of the ownership claims from "I hereby own all red objects" but the essential principle remains unaltered: an ownership claim in a class of physical objects. This manner of claiming ownership is simply incompatible with human behavior.

[Xyiana]

Once you download it for free, they can't sell it to you.

This simply isnt true. Not only there are ppl buying go books regradless of downloading big Go book collection from torrents, but you can have even more sales in some cases because you get better info about some books(for "fun", pirated version of Kiseido books from digital collections are much better quality rly disgusting work from Kiseido ).

And i think it is more than clear(at least for sane mind) that if you cant download something for free( or pirating if you like this term more ) this doesnt mean that you buy it for money. This is common stupidity from companies like RIAA when they talk about big money loss from sharing.

[hyperpape]

You connect your computer to the network, set it up to accept information over that network and respond in certain ways. Someone then submits information that has unanticipated effects and you call that a crime? Sure doesn't sound like a violation of anyone's individual rights. You're sounding dangerously utilitarian!

Funny, but I think you know that intent plays an important role in crime, and if we have previously determined that the machine and software are the property of the user, then it is a clear violation of those property rights, no?

No, I really can see no way in which it is a violation of property rights on a libertarian account. I have set up the computer to receive data. You have sent it data. I don't like the data, but so what? Can I also prohibit your right to insult me? On a libertarian account, there is no difference. So much the worse for "high church" libertarianism, in my book.

Further, suppose the IP is distributed with a license. Then so long as all people are aware of that license, the contract does bind them. They may not knowingly receive that material without accepting the terms. (Again, this is exactly how the GPL works). Even if there are edge cases where a third party receives the information in ignorance of the terms, in the ordinary case, you do get the protections of ordinary copyright, without any violations of anyone's individual rights.

True, but with no IP, even a license like the GPL would be non-binding to third parties (i.e. non-buyers). [/quote] Easy peasy. Restrict distribution to people who sign a contract. Make anyone who gets the text restrict who they show it to in the same way. And of course one can include a contractual restriction at the beginning of the book.

Note that many of Kinsella's examples, dealing with patents, address a different point. If I drive a car in public, it's true that anyone who sees it will learn things about its construction. So I can't force them to sign a contract to learn those things. But I can write a contract saying that you'll not show my book to other people unless they accept the same terms you accepted.

[Mef]

I think HKA's analogy is closer to reality, but it seems debatable to me if the database should even be sold.

It seems to me that Mr. Rockingchair & Co. primarily profit from the go records themselves, which came from pros. It's true that it may take time to compile the data into a computer format, but the real value in what is being sold is not an original work by the sellers. The real "authors" of the database are the pros. The people that put together their games are, in some ways, simply publishers of the original work.

I would disagree here, I would say the value that comes from a database like GoGoD is in the collection not in any individual game record*. In one of the many times this type of thread got tossed around RGG, someone made what I considered to be a very good comparison -- a dictionary. The value of a dictionary does not stem from any one definition, and in fact a large number of people would be able to generate reasonable definitions for many words (I would also imagine it's quite difficult to establish a copyright claim over a single definition for a common word). Some definitions may even include contextual references to other sources citing how some words have been used in literature...but at the end of the day what gives the dictionary value is that you have all these definitions collected in one place. If you are just looking for a pro game record (any game record) there are many places to get them for free, and likewise redistributing a single game record is unlikely to diminish the value of something like GoGoD...The value that people pay for is the fact that so many games have been collected into a single high quality source.



*There are some individual games that may increase the value of the database due to their obscurity, and the fact that they are likely only going to be found in GoGoD, but for the sake of this discussion I would claim a large portion of the value of the database is still in the fact that you have so many games collected in one place. Taken with the dictionary analogy, it may be that some dictionaries include esoteric definitions that are excluded from others.

[nagano]

No, I really can see no way in which it is a violation of property rights on a libertarian account. I have set up the computer to receive data. You have sent it data. I don't like the data, but so what? Can I also prohibit your right to insult me? On a libertarian account, there is no difference. So much the worse for "high church" libertarianism, in my book.

I'm not sure I understand what you are disputing here. I take it you are assuming that because Libertarians do not consider information to be property, you believe it naturally follows that espionage cannot be a crime. This is false, and I've never heard of a single Libertarian who defines property this way. Nor do I see any inconsistency here. I think you are making the same mistake made by the article:

"But the book cost them money

That's true. But it cost them a pretty small amount of money. You probably cost them more if you leave a mess in their public bathrooms, or mumble your latte order so that the clerk gets it wrong and has to do it over, but we don't give Barnes and Noble property rights in those things.

More to the point, this doesn't have anything to do with whether a good is rivalrous or not. It has to do with whether the good has a low marginal cost. Making records costs money too.

But not for the individual copy. Electronic files have zero marginal costs.

But hotel rooms and airplane seats also have near-zero marginal costs. Is it therefore okay to sneak into a hotel room, as long as you make the bed perfectly before you leave?

This brings us to the issue of trespass, which--despite the fact that it is often, maybe even usually, non-rivalrous, most libertarians don't support. If you own a cabin in a snowy and distant mountain, and I know for a fact that you cannot leave town for the weekend, is it okay to pick the lock and use my house?

You might break things.

Is it okay if I am very careful, or only occupy a small portion of the home filled with things that are not breakable?

I might change my mind and want to come.

The partners said everyone in your group has to work all weekend. Your wife is dying in a hospital bed, surrounded by all your friends and family. For whatever reason, I can be reasonably quite sure that you are not going to use this property this weekend. Is it okay, morally, for me to use it? Should you have legal rights against me if you find out? How about camping on a part of your property that you haven't trod in ten years?

Even if you clean up, you'll change things.

Seriously? We're arguing for a system of property rights because I disturbed some leaves on your property?

You might frighten away deer I hunt. You can't know whether you're damaging my property, or whether I might want to use it, which is why I should be able to decide whether I want you to change things.

But this is the argument of publishing houses, and increasingly, artists: they should be able to decide whether you get to make non-rivalrous use of what they created, and whether your use damages them.

Also, you could make the law clear that you had to be really, really sure that they wouldn't come, or you wouldn't break things, before you could use peoples' stuff. Law makes fine distinctions like this all the time.

(For that matter, as I understand it, the law actually does give me a right to trespass if, say, I am lost in a storm and am clearly going to freeze to death unless I break into your cabin. I may have to pay you for any damage I do, but I'm not legally in the wrong simply for entering your property.)

On the other hand, there are plenty of rivalrous uses that do not have clearly defined property rights, like how loud parties can be, how much smell or visual blight can be inflicted on a neighbor, how much care I have to take to keep the rat population down, how to allocate responsibilities and rights over common resources like ponds and trees that span property lines, and so forth. These questions are adjudicated differently in different jurisdictions, or by negotiation between neighbors, because no one has a particularly well developed theory of how such rivalrous uses should be allocated.

Now go back to those accounting entries at our bank. They do not take up any meaningful physical space, and they're non-rivalrous: if I copy them and pretend they're mine, you can still use yours."

This is exactly what I meant before when I said the article went wrong in its focus on rivalry. The distinction between trespassing, either in a hotel room or inside a computer, and holding rights in ideas has nothing to do with rivalry. Also I do not believe rivalry and scarcity are always the same. But even this is not the heart of the matter. The assertion both you and the article seem to be making is that squatting on already assigned property and copying said property are identical. This however exposes circular reasoning: they are assuming intellectual property in order to justify it. The difference with breaking into and using a hotel room is that it is someone else's property. However, if we copy a file, we simply rearrange our own physical property so that it holds the given information; we are not violating any rights in doing this. We recognize rights in individual copies of non-scarce goods, but there is no justification for a property right in the concept of the good itself.

Easy peasy. Restrict distribution to people who sign a contract. Make anyone who gets the text restrict who they show it to in the same way. And of course one can include a contractual restriction at the beginning of the book.

Note that many of Kinsella's examples, dealing with patents, address a different point. If I drive a car in public, it's true that anyone who sees it will learn things about its construction. So I can't force them to sign a contract to learn those things. But I can write a contract saying that you'll not show my book to other people unless they accept the same terms you accepted.

Okay, but suppose you have purchased a book under contract on the condition that you will not share it, but you inadvertently lose it. Someone else finds it, and not being bound by the contract, copies it. Surely you could not be charged for losing the book? But lets suppose that you actually gave the book to someone else, and just said that you lost it? In that case the rights holder could press charges but it would likely be very difficult to prove that you had given away the book rather than stolen it. So there is a real question as to whether this type of contract would be readily enforceable. But there is another major difference from public IP which is perhaps even more significant than the limitations of contract law. Under a government IP system, copyrights are awarded automatically, and are uniform across society. When you replace this system with private contracts, there will necessarily be as many, if not more, contract policies than there are companies. As people generally prefer greater freedom to less, it is likely that the companies with more lenient policies would fare better in the marketplace. So at the very least we can say that the environment would be more open and varied than the IP system is.

[RobertJasiek]

The real "authors" of the database are the pros.

Copyright law does not prevent progress of human knowledge. If work A uses exactly copied parts of work B, then it cites. In case of game records used in databases or books, the form of citation is stating the game context data like player names and date. In case of book sources, the citation states book title, author or page numbers.

[badukJr]

The real "authors" of the database are the pros.

Copyright law does not prevent progress of human knowledge. If work A uses exactly copied parts of work B, then it cites. In case of game records used in databases or books, the form of citation is stating the game context data like player names and date. In case of book sources, the citation states book title, author or page numbers.

Book sources however don't crib the unique text from the other book it is sourcing. Generally the reference is recast into the sourcing author's own words. The only exception that is common is that if the reference is to some profound quote where changing the wording would affect the meaning. Copying a game record move for move would be like copy a books text in its entirety then referencing the original author, as if it would make up for the breach.

I would have nothing against referencing a match, and commenting on it, but not providing the exact moves from the match.

[uPWarrior]

The real "authors" of the database are the pros.

Copyright law does not prevent progress of human knowledge. If work A uses exactly copied parts of work B, then it cites. In case of game records used in databases or books, the form of citation is stating the game context data like player names and date. In case of book sources, the citation states book title, author or page numbers.

Thanks for letting me know that I'm allowed to completely merge your database with 2 others, obviously citing them accordingly, and selling them for profit. Because you are not using parts of game records either, you are using them entirely.

Or is there a completely random and subjective number of citations I need to make so that "copying" becomes "citing"?